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ABSTRACT  
 
 
The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. (May 2011)  
Anton Sergeevich Kabeshkin, B.S., South Ural State University  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Robert W. Burch 
 
 
In this thesis I consider the problem of the distinctiveness of knowledge of our own 
mental states and attitudes. I consider four influential approaches to this problem: the 
epistemic approach, the “no reasons view,” the neo-expressivist approach and the 
rational agency approach. I argue that all of them face serious problems. I further argue 
that many of these problems are connected with the lack of fine-grained enough 
classification of the entities with respect to which we have self-knowledge. I suggest 
such a classification, distinguishing passive occurrent mental states, mental actions and 
standing attitudes, and argue that we should treat each of these categories separately for 
the purpose of explaining self-knowledge of them. I discuss in detail self-knowledge we 
have with respect to two of these categories: standing attitudes and mental actions. On 
my account self-knowledge of standing attitudes stands in a derivative relation to self-
knowledge of other kinds. In my discussion of self-knowledge of mental actions I 
establish that we have a distinctive non-observational kind of self-knowledge and show 
some specific characteristics of this kind of self-knowledge. In the end I attempt to relate 
self-knowledge of mental actions to practical knowledge in the ordinary sense of skill. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Among things we know and are able to speak about there is a certain class of things such 
that we assume that a competent speaker has a special authority with respect to 
knowledge about them. This class includes certain facts about us. For example, I am 
usually the best person to answer such questions as whether I am in pain now, or whether 
I prefer to eat some fish rather than meat, or whether I fear spiders. Of course, there are 
some cases when for some reason I am not aware of my wish or fear and someone else 
can judge about it better on the basis of observations of my behavior. However, as a rule, 
such judgments are overridden by my own resolute claims to the contrary, if my sincerity 
is granted. And it is much more difficult to find cases in which I mistakenly judge that I 
am in pain. 
Of course, not all facts about us have this kind of privilege. Facts about my 
appearance, for example, can be known by anyone with the same certainty as by me. The 
facts which I typically know with greater certainty than anyone else include only those 
which I know “from the inside” or “directly.” These are, in other words, facts about my 
mental states, although what exactly counts as a mental state and what is the nature of 
mental states is debatable.  
                                                 
  This thesis follows The Chicago Manual of Style. 
The problem of self-knowledge, that is, knowledge of one’s own mental states 
and acts as distinctive in comparison with knowledge of other kinds, has drawn 
2 
considerable attention in recent decades.1 Yet there is no general agreement even 
concerning the formulation of the principal question to be answered. Some authors are 
concerned with the problem of how we know our mental states and why this kind of 
knowledge is more certain than any other kind of knowledge. Others speak about the 
distinctive first-person authority (or privilege) of self-ascriptions of mental states. Later 
in this work I will argue that such a shift of attention towards the problem of the 
authority of self-ascriptions substitute the communicative problem — that is, the 
question Why do we generally trust people’s utterances about their mental states? — for 
the problem of knowledge of mental states. Such substitution may bring misleading 
results, for the problem of knowledge of mental states is more fundamental than, and 
should be solved independently from, the subordinate communicative question.  
Another source of problems is the question whether a single explanation of self-
knowledge about all mental states should be given, or rather multiple explanations for 
different kinds of such states are needed. Those authors who are inclined to the second 
option typically distinguish two kinds of self-knowledge.2
                                                 
1 Some essays are collected, for instance, in Smith, Wright and Macdonald 1998, and Cassam 1994. Other 
references will be given in the course of the paper. 
 I will argue that different 
kinds of self-knowledge should indeed be recognized and I will even radicalize the 
existing approaches in this direction, distinguishing at least three different categories of 
the entities with respect to which we have distinctive self-knowledge (allowing also for 
intermediate cases). I will argue that knowledge of each category needs a separate 
2 Moran 2001, p. XXXIII distinguishes occurrent mental states such as sensations and feelings, and 
standing attitudes (beliefs, intentions and so on). Boyle 2009 distinguishes (following Kant) active and 
passive kinds of self-knowledge, the first based on spontaneity of an agent, the second dependent upon 
some other mechanism, such as “inner sense”. 
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explanation, although these explanations need not be unrelated. In particular, we should 
distinguish occurrent mental acts (such as making an assumption, silent utterance or 
imagining something), passive occurrent mental states (sensations, feelings), and 
dispositional attitudes (non-occurrent beliefs, desires, etc., although there are more 
subtle distinctions within the last category, which I will briefly touch).3 I will further 
argue that many problems of the existing accounts of self-knowledge are a result of the 
lack of an adequate classification like the one suggested above. In this work I will also 
consider the main accounts suggested specifically for explaining self-knowledge of our 
actions in general and of our mental actions in particular on the one hand, and self-
knowledge of our beliefs on the other. I will argue that the most promising of these 
accounts are those that relate our self-knowledge to our agency (primarily in the case of 
actions and in a derivative way in the case of beliefs).4 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that I use the expression “dispositional attitudes” in this paper quite broadly. Roughly 
it means just “that, which belongs to our mental life but is not occurrent,” while an “occurrent state” is that 
which consists in subject’s possession of some categorial mental property. There is, for example, an 
important difference between “powers” or capacities and just reliable dispositions but, so far as I can see, 
my arguments do not hinge on this distinction. In the paper I will sometimes use just “attitudes” for the 
sake of brevity. 
In Chapter II I will provide an outline of the main accounts of self-knowledge 
suggested in the literature and then will criticize them. In the first section of that chapter, 
I will consider the epistemic approach (or perceptual model), the “no reasons view,” the 
neo-expressivist account of self-knowledge, and the approach that links self-knowledge 
and agency. In the second section of Chapter II I will criticize these accounts and will 
show that none of them is adequate for the whole range of phenomena with respect to 
which we have self-knowledge. In Chapter III I will argue that any adequate theory of 
4 For the sake of brevity I will often call this account “the agency approach” in the rest of the work. 
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self-knowledge should recognize different categories of entities with respect to which we 
have self-knowledge. Moreover, one should not start from the assumption that self-
knowledge of all these entities can be explained in a uniform way. In the first section of 
Chapter III I will present and argue for my classification of entities with respect to which 
we have distinctive self-knowledge. In the second section I will attempt to explain 
failures of the version of agency approach which links self-knowledge of our beliefs and 
intentions with rational deliberation. After that I will suggest an alternative account of 
self-knowledge of our beliefs and intentions based on my classification developed in the 
first section. 
In Chapter IV I will argue that self-knowledge of our own actions in general and 
of our mental actions in particular is based upon non-observational knowledge of a 
special kind. In the first section I will provide a historical overview of this position. In 
the second section I will raise some objections to the idea of distinct non-observational 
knowledge of our own actions and will outline some alternatives to this idea. However, 
these alternatives work only with respect to our overt bodily actions and not with respect 
to our mental actions. Thus, in the rest of Chapter IV I will discuss self-knowledge of 
mental actions. In the third section I will discuss what counts as a mental action. In the 
fourth section I will present and criticize the accounts of self-knowledge of mental 
actions which are not based on the recognition of a distinct source of knowledge. This 
criticism, I will suggest, opens the way for the acceptance of the idea that self-
knowledge of our mental actions is non-observational, non-inferential and yet rationally 
justified. Finally, in the fifth section I will attempt to elaborate this idea and to provide 
5 
more substance to it. In particular, drawing from the works of G.E.M. Anscombe5 and 
Kieran Setiya,6 I will attempt to link it with the so-called “knowledge how.” However, 
this suggested link will have only the hypothetical status, and I will raise some problems 
for this development. In the conclusion I will briefly summarize the argument of the 
work and will point out to the connection between self-knowledge of our attitudes and 
self-knowledge of our actions in light of my treatment of self-knowledge of our actions 
in Chapter III. 
                                                 
5 Anscombe 2000. 
6 Setiya 2008 and 2009. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE EXISTING APPROACHES AND THEIR CRITICISM 
The Exposition of the Existing Approaches 
 
In this section I will expound in turn four prominent accounts of self-knowledge to 
provide the reader with an overview of the field. I will postpone the criticism of these 
accounts until the next section except insofar the criticism of rival approaches is 
necessary to elucidate the motivation for the development of other approaches. 
The Epistemic Approach 
There are multiple versions of the epistemic approach, but they all concur that we know 
about our mental states because we somehow “detect” them via some epistemic 
mechanism which works on the personal level. The special certainty of this knowledge 
is, accordingly, accounted for by the high reliability of this epistemic mechanism. 
Finkelstein (2003) calls the approach in general “detectivism” and distinguishes “old 
detectivism” from “new detectivism”. The old version is connected with what is often 
called the “Cartesian paradigm.” It considers both our mental states and our attitudes as 
special objects that belong to consciousness as opposed to the physical world, and that 
should be perceived in order to be known. It then posits that we possess some very 
special “mechanism” called introspection, by means of which we can indeed perceive 
these states and attitudes. In this respect it is similar to our ordinary senses but, unlike 
7 
them, it is infallible and immediate. Through it we can perceive our states without a 
possibility of mistake. These properties, of course, account for the first-person privilege 
and the presumption of truth of self-ascriptions of mental states. However, because it can 
hardly be the case that any bodily process can be infallible, the infallible introspection 
can only be a capacity of an immaterial soul. Thus, this view naturally leads to dualism. 
Because of this association of “old detectivism” with dualism, old detectivism is 
not considered to be a viable option by most of the contemporary philosophers. Thus, 
those who are still attracted by the epistemic approach usually hold that we know our 
mental states via a fallible perceptual capacity (“new detectivism” in Finkelstein’s 
terminology).
According to Armstrong,
 One way to develop this view is to posit that we have an introspective 
ability that is more akin to ordinary sense perception than the Cartesian introspection, 
and so it can be mistaken just as our eyesight or hearing. This is the version of epistemic 
approach I will be mainly concerned with throughout the work. One of its prominent 
contemporary proponents is D. M. Armstrong. 
7
                                                 
7 Armstrong 1963 and 1994. 
 introspection has a structure similar to that of 
perception. In particular, in introspection we should distinguish that which introspected 
from the introspecting, as in perception we distinguish the perceived object and the act 
of perception. Unlike in perception, however, in introspection both the entity 
introspected and the introspecting are mental states; but they are distinct mental states. 
Their distinctness is one of Armstrong’s primary grounds for asserting that introspection 
is fallible (I will consider his arguments for this shortly). Moreover, not only can 
8 
introspection be mistaken, but it also does not perceive all the mental events. Thus, 
Armstrong denies what is sometimes called “omniscience” in discussions of first-person 
knowledge, that is, the claim that all mental events are necessarily conscious.8
Armstrong not only explicitly asserts the fallibility of introspection, but also 
argues for it. To be more precise, he argues that introspection cannot be logically 
infallible. One of his arguments is a familiar Wittgensteinian one that in cases where 
mistakes are not possible it is inappropriate to talk about knowledge as well: “We can 
speak of gaining knowledge only in cases where it makes sense to speak of thinking 
wrongly that we have gained knowledge.”
 Indeed, 
this is quite reasonable provided that the mental state of perceiving is distinct from the 
mental state perceived, which Armstrong maintains. 
9
Another argument is based on the distinctness of the target mental state of 
introspection and the state of introspecting itself. The point is a Humean one that it is 
always possible to conceive one of the “distinct existences” without the other. But, the 
argument goes, what is conceivable is logically possible, and thus, in our case, it is 
logically possible that the introspecting mental state occurs while the mental state 
introspected does not (or vice versa). Note that this argument rules out only logical 
 This argument, however, does not seem to be 
conclusive. One can contend that a true proposition that one holds to be true for good 
reasons must count as knowledge whether or not it is possible for a subject not to hold it 
to be true. And the fact that a proposition cannot be false is arguably quite a good reason 
to hold it true. 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Alston 1971, 228. 
9 Armstrong 1963, 422. 
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infallibility of introspection. Armstrong does not consider whether introspection can be 
nomologically infallible, that is, always yield correct results because of certain 
psychological or, rather, physiological (since Armstrong identifies all mental states with 
brain states) laws. 
In any case, we can see that one of the most important characteristics of the 
epistemic approach is the distinctness of the entities perceived by introspection and the 
states of perceiving themselves. This assumption is rejected by at least some of the 
versions of the view which will be considered in the next subsection. 
 
The “No Reasons View” 
As we have seen, the epistemic approach involves the view that we possess a capacity to 
perceive our own mental states. For its adherents our beliefs about our own mental states 
are justified by deliverances of this capacity in a way parallel to how our beliefs about 
the external world are justified by deliverances of ordinary perception. Some authors 
which are not content with the epistemic approach have argued that there is no such a 
capacity. Rather, they maintain, our second-order beliefs (that is, beliefs about other 
beliefs) are given rise to “automatically,” without mediation by personal-level reason-
giving capacity or mechanism. Because of the absence of such a capacity we are not able 
to provide reasons for having second-order beliefs: we simply do not have such reasons. 
At this point the “no reasons view,” as it is called by some authors, is supported 
by our actual linguistic behavior. When we make reports about, say, our current 
sensations or beliefs, we do not provide further reasons for our knowledge that we have 
10 
those sensations or beliefs. In the unlikely situation when someone will ask the reporting 
subject to justify her claim that she has those sensations or beliefs, the subject will not 
respond that she has perceived them. Rather, she will wonder if the questioner has 
understood her well enough.  
Thus, partisans of the “no reasons view” accept the apparent lack of reasons for 
the beliefs about our own mental states at face value. Still, they want to maintain that 
these beliefs are, at least as a rule, true. So they need to show how the correspondence of 
the presence of first-order mental states, acts or attitudes and of the possession of beliefs 
about them is ensured. Now, there are different ways to do this. One way is simply to 
postulate the existence of a subpersonal causal mechanism that reliably produces beliefs 
about the presence of our mental states in case when these mental states are present. 
Since this causal mechanism operates only at the subpersonal level, it is merely reliable 
in a sense that it does not provide epistemic reasons for judgments and beliefs to the 
effect that target mental states are present, which a subject can provide for the 
justification of these judgments and beliefs. Such view is naturally accompanied by the 
reliabilist epistemology.10 
                                                 
10 In this passage I am indebted to Peacocke 1998, 76-7. 
There are various reasons for dissatisfaction with this reliabilist version of the 
“no reasons view.” An alternative to this version is what David Finkelstein called the 
constitutive approach. According to such an approach the lower-order and the higher-
order mental states are not distinct entities. Thus, this version of the “no reasons view” 
rejects not only the core of the epistemic approach, namely the existence of a personal-
11 
level capacity to “detect” our own mental states, but even the assumption on which the 
epistemic approach is founded, that is, the distinct existences of lower-order mental 
states and judgments or beliefs about those states. 
This view as applied to entities such as intentions is sometimes supported by 
reference to Wittgenstein’s criticism of certain forms of Platonism about intentions. This 
line of argumentation suggests that subsequent judgments about the content of prior 
intentions somehow determine the content of those intentions. Thus Crispin Wright: 
“The role of subsequent judgement is indeed not to mediate somehow in the connection 
between the content of an intention and its execution… but rather to enter into 
determination of what the content of an anterior intention is to be understood as having 
been.”11 And, a little further in the text:  
The Platonist mythology is a mythology of such constitutive independence… 
Against this Platonism I want to set what I take to be an idea of 
Wittgensteinian authorship, although it is of course very familiar from the 
writings of Davidson: that the content of a subject’s intentional states is not 
something which may merely be accessed, as it were indirectly, by 
interpretative methods… but is something which is intrinsically sensitive to 
the deliverances of best interpretative methodology. That is a methodology 
which in principle must include within its conspectus the whole sweep of a 
subject’s sayings and doings, including future ones, without bound. 
                                                 
11 Wright 1998, 29. 
Whether or not this is a fair interpretation of Wittgenstein or Davidson is a 
controversial question (McDowell, for instance, resists Wright’s reading of them). 
What is important for us here, though, is that such an interpretation provides some 
flesh to the constitutivist view that claims higher-order judgments to be constitutive 
of lower-order mental states. Of course, while putatively Wittgensteinian or 
12 
Davidsonian arguments might at least make it plausible that higher-order judgments 
are constitutive of our intentions, this can hardly be said about other kinds of mental 
entities. But, as I have said earlier, I will reserve the criticism for the next section. 
 
Neo-Expressivism 
Another interesting approach that purports to explain distinctive first-person knowledge 
is neo-expressivism. This view shifts the focus of attention towards the way we talk 
about our own mental states or otherwise express them, and thus attempts to shed light 
on our relation to these states via the analysis of our expressive capacities. 
Neo-expressivists claim that what is distinctive in our relation to our mental 
states is that our self-ascriptions of these states can normally directly “express” these 
states.12
                                                 
12 Recent publications of the proponents of this view include Bar-On and Long 2001, Finkelstein 2003 and 
Bar-On 2004. 
 By “expression,” for example, Bar-On means “giving vent, airing” and so on, 
that is, manifesting one’s mental state by either action or self-ascription. Thus, one can 
express her pain by screaming, by making a grimace or by some kind of utterance. Non-
verbal expressions are sometimes called “natural expressions.” In the case of verbal 
expression an expressive utterance can be either self-ascriptive, such as “I feel pain,” or 
not self-ascriptive (for instance “It burns!”). A self-ascriptive utterance is called an 
avowal. For the present goals the most important difference between avowals and other 
kinds of expressive behavior is that avowals, unlike natural expressions, also have 
13 
semantic content that self-ascribes the same mental state as the one they express.13 To 
explicate how this is possible, Bar-On distinguishes two aspects of avowals: avowals as 
acts and avowals as products.14 Avowals as acts express relevant mental states, while 
avowals as products ascribe the same states to a speaker. For example, on the neo-
expressivist view an utterance “I feel pain” expresses (shares, gives vent to, airs) the 
speaker’s pain in virtue of its being a specific kind of act that has a similarity to the more 
simple means of expression. But, at the same time, this utterance ascribes this same pain 
to the speaker in virtue of its linguistic meaning. 
Now, on the neo-expressivist account, avowals enjoy the distinctive first-person 
authority in the same manner and for the same reasons as do natural expressions of 
mental states such as screams, twitches, smiles. More specifically, avowals inherit their 
distinctive first-person authority from natural expressions. As Bar-On argues,15
[A] small child, Jenny, eagerly reaching for a teddy bear. Jenny simply 
wants the toy, and her reaching for it directly reveals her desire, quite 
 children 
learn to substitute avowals for natural expressions in the course of their development and 
start using avowals to express their mental states. Thus, when someone uses an avowal 
to express her own mental state, she does not base the self-ascription which is contained 
in the avowal on some prior epistemic judgment to the effect that she is in that state, as 
one does not base her smile or scream on a prior epistemic judgment. Consider this 
illustration from Bar-On (which also shows her view on the substitution of avowals for 
natural expressions in the course of child’s development): 
                                                 
13 Verbal expressive utterances that are not avowals, of course, also have semantic content, but it does not 
self-ascribe states expressed to speakers. 
14 Bar-On 2004, 251 ff. 
15 Ibid., 286 ff. 
14 
independently of any judgment on her part to the effect that she wants the 
teddy. Using previous jargon, we might say that there is no epistemic distance 
between Jenny’s behavior and her desire for the toy. Her present state is in no 
way an epistemic target for her; she simply gives vent to it. And in normal 
circumstances, her audience will be directly responsive to the state they 
perceive her to be in; barring contravening reasons, they will simply hand her 
the toy. 
But now consider another episode in which Jenny emits a certain sound 
(“Uh!”), or calls out “Teddy!”, as she reaches for the toy. And finally, 
consider an episode in which she avows “I want Teddy,” perhaps with no 
reaching at all. Intuitively, the verbal emissions, just like the reaching 
behavior, which we would consider a natural expression of Jenny’s desire, 
may all ‘come directly from’ the child’s desire. They seem equally ‘pressed 
out’ from her, and they appear no more driven by a prior deliberation, 
consideration, or determination regarding how things are presently with her. 
The verbal utterances seem to be equally expressive of her desire for the 
teddy.16 
The fact that avowals are not grounded on prior epistemic judgments is what explains 
avowals’ epistemic security. Even if one can make a mistake in avowal (and Bar-On 
leaves open such a possibility), such a mistake will not be akin to the types of mistakes 
associated with judgments about the external world. Rather, such mistakes will be 
connected with failures of rationality (as in self-deception or wishful thinking) or 
failures of expression (as when one attempts to express pain when one does not actually 
feels it but merely anticipates it17).  
 
Thus, neo-expressivism ties our distinctive authority over our own mental states 
to our ability to express them and then analyses the kinds of self-expressions and their 
structure. Ultimately, on this account the peculiarity of self-ascriptive expressions is 
what explains our first-person authority. 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 242. 
17 Ibid., 322. 
15 
The Rational Agency Approach 
Another promising account of self-knowledge links our distinctive first-person authority 
to our capacities as rational agents. In this subsection I will consider this account as it is 
developed by Richard Moran in his book Authority and Estrangement (2001). Although 
there are also developments in this vein by Matthew Boyle and especially by Sebastian 
Rödl, I will here consider only Moran’s view, for while I think it is on the right way, it 
illustrates one important mistake which can be made on this route. 
In his account Moran first distinguishes self-knowledge of standing attitudes such 
as beliefs and intentions from self-knowledge of passive occurrent mental states. He 
writes that it is plausible that two different stories should be told about these two kinds 
of self-knowledge. Then he explicitly narrows his investigation to the case of standing 
attitudes.18 His basic idea is that we know our attitudes not by observation, not by any 
kind of “inner sense” (thus Moran rejects the epistemic approach), but by actively 
forming them, by making up our mind. To appreciate this idea, it is instructive to 
compare two different stances which can be taken with respect to our attitudes: a 
practical or deliberative stance and a theoretical stance.19
                                                 
18 Moran 2001, 9-10. 
 In taking the theoretical stance 
one asks oneself whether, for example, she wants to do A, whether she believes that p, 
etc., and answers this question by ascertaining empirical evidence about oneself. This 
evidence can be gathered in more or less the same way one can gather facts about 
someone other than oneself: by observing one’s overt behavior, reflecting on one’s 
biographical facts, using methods of cognitive science or neurophysiology, etc. Perhaps, 
19 Ibid., 55-60. 
16 
unlike in the case with other people, one can also use introspection to figure out whether 
one wants to do A, believes that p, etc., but the question that can be answered in this way 
is still a question asked in a theoretical stance. By contrast, questions asked in a 
deliberative stance are related to the process or to the outcome of making up our minds. 
Such questions as “do I intend to do something?” or “do I believe that...” asked in this 
sense will be answered not by the psychological or behavioral observation of the person 
who asks them, but by forming an intention or by considering evidence for and against 
the belief in question, respectively. So, this kind of deliberative reflection involves 
reasoning, theoretical in the case of belief20
The deliberative stance is characterized by the so-called transparency condition.
 and practical in the case of intention. Moran 
notes that this reasoning is something more than merely normative appraisal of our 
attitudes or matters of fact, arguing that normative appraisal may well be applied to the 
past attitudes as well as to the present, but we cannot form our past attitudes. 
Deliberation ends not with a normative judgment but with an intention to do something, 
a desire for something, a belief, etc.—that is, with the attitude in question itself. 
21
                                                 
20 Here it is important not to confuse theoretical reasoning involved in the belief formation with theoretical 
stance, which we can take with respect to our attitudes, as described earlier. 
 
Consider the case of belief. When deciding what to believe, our gaze is, so to say, 
directed to the world. In order to answer the question whether to believe that p, we are 
considering reasons for the entirely different question: whether p is the case. While 
considering the similar question about some other person, we do not conflate the 
psychological question whether that person believes that p and the world-directed 
21 Ibid. 60-65. 
17 
question whether p. The same distinction clearly can be applied in our own case as well, 
for we are as susceptible to error as anyone else. Nevertheless it would be paradoxical to 
say both “I believe that p” and “it is not the case that p” (this is so-called Moore’s 
paradox). It is worth noticing, though, that even in our own case we can sometimes ask 
questions about our beliefs in the “theoretical” stance when we will be looking precisely 
for the evidence of the presence of the psychological state, such as certain behavior. This 
might happen in a context of psychoanalytic treatment, when the belief in question is 
unconscious, or of analysis of one’s feelings which is characteristic for heroes in the 
literature of romantic love.  
Although his paradigm case is the case of beliefs, Moran thinks that the same 
kind of transparency is also applicable to attitudes other than beliefs, such as fears, 
desires, intentions, even emotions.22
These considerations still leave the main question open, namely the question how 
exactly the unique first-person capacity to be a rational agent and to form one’s attitude 
via deliberation explains first-person knowledge. For one can grant that we can 
deliberate and that as a result of deliberation a certain attitude will be formed in me, but 
argue that it is not evident that I will thereby know that I have this attitude. I am not sure 
 He is trying to find for them analogues of the 
transparency to the world and argues that, for instance, fears or desires can be formed 
and in the fundamental case are formed via weighing reasons for and against fearing 
something or desiring something, with a gaze directed to the world. For instance, I can 
consider whether something is threatening and thus whether I am to fear it. 
                                                 
22 See, especially, Moran 2002, 206 ff. 
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that Moran provides an explicit and satisfactory answer to this challenge. However, I 
think that this gap in his account can be plausibly filled in.23 It could be noticed that an 
action explanation, that is, an explanation why I am performing an action, is the same 
thought with which I conclude my practical deliberation whether to do that action. The 
same goes for belief explanations and conclusions of theoretical deliberations. For 
instance, if I have proved a logical theorem, the proof I have made will also be an 
explanation why I hold that this theorem is valid. Because of this, in the (successful) end 
of theoretical reasoning I give an answer which is also a reason for my holding the belief 
that resulted from this reasoning (and likewise for practical reasoning and intention). 
Furthermore, it seems plausible to assume that if I know why I hold some belief, I also 
know that I hold this belief. Thus, if I went through the deliberation which issued in a 
belief, I know the reasons for which I came to have that belief, hence I know why I now 
hold it, and hence I know that I hold it. The same reasoning can be mutatis mutandis 
applied to intentional actions.  
 
So, on this approach, our capacities for deliberation explain the first-person 
authority at least with respect to our beliefs and intentions. How far the rational agency 
approach can be extended is an open question. 
Criticism of the Existing Approaches 
                                                 
23 In what follows in this paragraph I am much obliged to Sebastian Rödl’s recent book Self-
Consciousness, in particular to chapters 2 and 3. Rödl’s book is very rich and intricate, and I will only use 
one of his ideas, and even that only in a sketchy way. 
In this section I will provide the criticism of the approaches outlined above. As far as the 
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epistemic approach, the “no reasons view,” and the neo-expressivist approach go, I will 
criticize them while taking into account that they are supposed to explain all kinds of 
self-knowledge, since their proponents typically do not restrict the application of these 
approaches to a particular class of entities. On the other hand, since proponents of the 
rational agency approach do restrict it to standing attitudes and dispositions such as 
beliefs and intentions (with a possible expansion to the attitudes such as desire or fear), I 
will take into account this self-restriction. 
 
Criticism of the Epistemic Approach 
I have already mentioned that the old version of the epistemic approach leads to the 
Cartesian dualism, which makes it rather unpopular among contemporary philosophers. 
Nevertheless, part of my criticism will be directed against all kinds of the epistemic 
approach. First, however, I will expound several objections against specifically the “new 
epistemic approach,” as they are developed by David Finkelstein.24 
                                                 
24 Finkelstein 2003, 9-27. 
 First, it is important to notice that first-person authority in only applicable to 
conscious mental states and attitudes. If one is angry at someone but is not conscious of 
this anger, one’s self-ascriptions of it will be based on the sources of information similar 
to those we use to judge about other people’s attitudes. Hence such self-ascriptions are 
no more authoritative that judgments of others who can observe the subject’s behavior. 
According to the epistemic approach what makes attitudes conscious and explains the 
first-person authority we have with respect to them is some form of the inner sense. 
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Similarly, if there are unconscious sensations (and we have seen that, for example, 
Armstrong holds that there are), only those sensations are conscious which are perceived 
by the inner sense. Now, if this inner sense is similar to the ordinary “outer” senses, it is 
not clear why its objects should be conscious. That is to say, the attempt to model the 
inner sense on the outer senses fails at this point: the inner sense should significantly 
differ from the outer senses in that it renders what it perceives conscious. And merely 
postulating that it does so does not give us an explanation why it does. This point 
undermines the aspiration of the proponents of the new epistemic approach to make a 
break with the Cartesian tradition of construing the inner sense as something very 
special. 
Furthermore, whereas some mental entities do have a certain phenomenal 
character, such as that of pain, anger and, probably, fear or desire, there are others that 
lack it. It is not clear whether intentions have it or, if they do, whether it differs from that 
of desires. But it seems clear that beliefs do not have a specific phenomenal character: 
there seems to be no “feeling like” having a belief. Thus, it seems that the inner sense 
model does not accommodate all the mental phenomena with respect to which we have 
characteristic self-knowledge. 
Now, the epistemic approach faces problems that are not exclusive for its modern 
versions.25
                                                 
25 The argument is adapted from that of Shoemaker’s (1998, 128). 
 If indeed we perceive our mental states, acts and attitudes by the inner sense, 
the question arises: How do we know that these mental states, acts or attitudes are our 
states rather than someone else’s? If we perceive just a mental state, it is not clear why 
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should we ascribe it to ourselves. A possible answer could be that one does not perceive 
just a mental state but oneself possessing that mental state. But this answer only pushes 
the problem a step back, for the new question arises: How is this self identified as one’s 
own self? It does not seem that we ever do identify some self as our own. But even if the 
proponent of the epistemic approach will attempt to disregard the appearances and assert 
that we do identify our selves given in introspection as ours, say, as possessors of unique 
sets of properties which we know before the act of introspection, we can further ask: 
How do we know those properties from the supposedly unique sets themselves? If they 
are obtained by introspection, then infinite regress is threatening. If they are not obtained 
by introspection, then we possess some self-knowledge that is not provided by 
introspection, and then it is shown at the very least that introspection cannot explain all 
self-knowledge. 
Shoemaker considers the following response to this argument: one can argue that 
only one self, namely my own, can possibly be the object of my inner sense, and thus it 
is not necessary to identify it. Shoemaker notices that “this amounts to saying that I can 
infallibly identify the observed self as myself by the fact that it is introspectively 
observed by me.” However, this response presupposes that I know that it is indeed my 
self who is the subject of this particular introspection. But then this will be the piece of 
self-knowledge, which is not obtained via introspection, and the main point of the 
argument remains untouched. Thus, the epistemic approach cannot explain self-
knowledge of all kinds, and even if there is introspection of some sort, its successful 
operation presupposes certain self-knowledge. 
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Criticism of the “No Reasons View” 
As I have mentioned during the exposition of the “no reasons view,” some of its versions 
are dependent upon the reliabilist epistemology. Now there are many people who object 
to it, for on their view beliefs that are simply reliably caused by non-rational 
mechanisms are not justified. Reliabilism offers us, in John McDowell’s words, 
“exculpations where we wanted justifications.”26 And if one rejects reliabilism in 
general, it is very odd to make an exception in one particular case and allow the 
application of the reliabilist epistemology to the case of self-knowledge only. 
 Moreover, although some mental entities with respect to which we have self-
knowledge lack phenomenal quality, as was noticed above, most of them do have such 
quality. As Christopher Peacocke notes,27 such mental states and attitudes can give 
reasons. Specifically they can provide “a conceptually equipped thinker” with reasons 
for self-ascription of these mental states and attitudes. And if a mental state gives reasons 
for a belief or judgment about this state, then they should be distinct states, since we do 
not count as justifications of belief that p references to this same belief. This argument 
works against the constitutive versions of the “no reasons view” as well as against the 
less sophisticated versions. 
                                                 
26 McDowell 1994, 8. McDowell’s phrase at that place is directly aimed at what he calls “the Myth of the 
Given,” but he also applies it to any epistemology which offers merely external constraint for our beliefs, 
rather than justifications. 
 A further objection to the specifically constitutive accounts runs as follows. On 
these accounts mental states or attitudes and the corresponding higher-order beliefs are 
identical. Because of that, it seems that such accounts are committed to the view that 
27 Peacocke 1998, 83. 
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either there are no wrong higher-order beliefs (if higher-order beliefs constitute our 
possessing lower-order mental states or attitudes) or that there are no lower-order states 
or attitudes, such that there are no corresponding higher-order beliefs about them (if it is 
part of our possession of lower-order mental states or attitudes to have corresponding 
higher-order beliefs about them). However, there are counterexamples to both of these 
commitments.  
The example of the wrong higher-order belief about one’s attitude would be a 
higher-order belief obtained in an “indirect way,” for example by observing one’s own 
behavior. As I have noticed earlier, it is quite possible to form beliefs about one’s own 
attitudes in this way. And of course it is possible to make a mistake when forming beliefs 
in this way. Thus, it is possible to have a mistaken higher-order belief about one’s 
attitude, which seems to be precluded if having a higher-order belief is what constitutes 
possessing a lower-order attitude.28 As for an example of a lower-order state or an 
attitude without a corresponding higher-order belief about it, one can just take any 
unconscious state or attitude. Even if one objects to the idea of unconsciousness in any 
sense reminiscent of psychoanalysis, I think it is clear that there are perceptions to which 
we just do not pay attention and so do not form beliefs about them. Incidentally, the 
evidence is collected that even quite complex mental phenomena such as daydreaming 
may remain undetected by a person engaged into daydreaming.29 
                                                 
28 Martin 1998, 107. 
I conclude that the “no reasons view” does not work as an explanation of self-
knowledge either. 
29 See, for example, Schooler 2002. 
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Criticism of Neo-Expressivism 
In my criticism of the neo-expressivist approach I would not like to downplay some of 
its interesting insights in explaining the distinctive authority of avowals. However, I 
contend that we should distinguish two different questions which are not reducible to 
each other. One question is “Why do we normally presume that people’s self-ascriptions 
of mental states, if sincere, are true?” I suggest to call it the question of “the 
communicative aspect of self-knowledge.” It may well be that the neo-expressivist 
account provides a correct answer to this question. Another question is “How do we 
obtain knowledge of our own mental states and acts and why is it so reliable, if not 
infallible?” This is the more fundamental problem of self-knowledge. I contend that neo-
expressivism does not resolve this problem. 
To see this, we need to consider how neo-expressivism explains the difference 
between conscious and unconscious mental states or attitudes. This explanation is 
important because distinctively authoritative self-knowledge can be knowledge only of 
our conscious mental states, acts or attitudes, for the ways to get knowledge of 
unconscious entities are essentially the same we use to get knowledge of other people’s 
minds. For neo-expressivists the condition for a mental state’s or an attitude’s being 
conscious has the form “The mental state X is conscious if the subject who has it is able 
to avow it.”30
Now it is plausible that there are counterexamples to this condition. Consider the 
case of a normal adult who has recently sustained damage, say, to his Broca’s and 
 
                                                 
30 Cf. Finkelstein 2003, 120: “Someone’s mental state is conscious if he has an ability to express it merely 
by self-ascribing it.” 
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Wernicke’s brain zones and is also paralyzed, say, as a result of a car accident. Let us 
stipulate that in this situation because of the brain damage this person is unable to 
express his mental states in speech or in thought; nor is he able to express them even by 
gestures or mimicry (because of the paralysis). Yet it seems plausible that he could be 
conscious of at least such mental states as pain or other sensations in just about the same 
way that normal adults are, since he underwent normal mental development, including 
linguistic acquisition, and since his psychic setup is thus as developed as anyone else’s 
is. Perhaps he is not conscious of his beliefs (that is, he is not consciously believing 
something) or other attitudes, but there are no apparent reasons for denying that he is 
consciously experiencing phenomenal qualities of his occurrent mental states. 
Some might think that this counterexample or similar counterexamples are 
inconclusive. Yet it seems that they at least make it plausible that consciousness of at 
least occurrent mental states and an ability to express them are different things and, 
moreover, one can exist apart from the other.31 I think that what brings neo-expressivists 
to the conclusion that they are connected more tightly is their failure to distinguish the 
kinds of self-knowledge we have with respect to attitudes and with respect to mental acts 
or passive occurrent mental states. Now I will suggest an argument that shows more 
formally than the counterexample above that consciousness of at least occurrent mental 
states is not to be explicated in terms of an ability to avow those states. 
                                                 
31 For the sake of simplicity in the rest of this section I will sometimes write “consciousness of” a state 
where Finkelstein would have “being consciously in” that state. 
Let us accept the premises: 
26 
1. The ability to avow or otherwise express one's mental states, acts or attitudes is 
a disposition. 
This is so because any ability or “power to do” is a disposition, broadly speaking (that is, 
not a categorial property or an occurrent state). 
2. The property of a state’s or an act’s being conscious is a categorial property. 
I will discuss this premise after the full exposition of the argument. 
3. One entity cannot be both a disposition and a categorial property or an 
occurrent state. 
From these premises it immediately follows that 
4. Being conscious of a mental state and being able to avow or otherwise express 
it are not the same things. 
This is just a preliminary result, and it does not on its own preclude the conditional 
analysis of consciousness of mental states, which Finkelstein provides. Even if being 
conscious of a state and being able to avow it are not the same thing, being conscious of 
the state might be explained in terms of the ability to avow it. 
Now I will add another consideration as a premise: 
5. A categorial property or event cannot be explained only by a disposition.  
To see this, consider the following. To explain the glass being broken we have to refer 
not only to its fragility, but also to the fact that it was hit by something. Conversely, 
dispositions can (perhaps not always, but certainly sometimes) be explained only by 
categorial properties or occurrent states. Thus, the fragility of glass is explained by the 
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fact that it has a specific structure, and having such-and-such structure is a categorial 
property. 
Now a stronger result with respect to the consciousness of occurrent mental states 
can be established:  
6. A property of a state’s or an act’s being conscious cannot be explained only by 
any disposition, including an ability to avow or otherwise express it. 
By an “explanation” I here mean the conditional of the form “if A then B,” where A is a 
conjunction of conditions sufficient for B obtaining. Thus, while the structure of glass 
entails its fragility, the event of glass breaking is entailed by the conjunction of the fact 
that glass is fragile and the event of its being hit. The conclusion of the argument, then, 
can be expressed in the following way: 
6*. A property of a state’s or an act’s being conscious is not entailed by any 
conjunction, whose conjuncts are only dispositions. 
But Finkelstein’s conditional has just this logical form. It states that the property of 
someone’s mental state’s being conscious is entailed by his ability to avow this state, and 
this ability is a disposition. Thus, if my argument is sound, then the neo-expressivist 
account of the property of being conscious of mental states and acts cannot be correct. 
And if neo-expressivists lack a proper account of what constitutes consciousness of 
mental states, then their account of self-knowledge cannot be the whole story and is 
dependent upon the proper account of what constitutes consciousness of mental states. 
Now, a proponent of neo-expressivism might question premise 2. Thus, 
Finkelstein distinguishes between being conscious that one is in some state of mind and 
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being consciously in that state of mind.32 Being conscious that one fears something, say, 
is just being aware that one has fear, and this awareness can be obtained by, for example, 
a consultation with a therapist. But being consciously in fear is, according to Finkelstein, 
tied to the ability to express it in a self-ascription, and this ability cannot be obtained just 
by such indirect means. One can then argue that being consciously in fear is actually a 
disposition and not an occurrent property or event.33
This account looks plausible when it is applied to attitudes such as fear or desire. 
But it immediately loses its plausibility when one tries to apply it to occurrent states or 
acts. Consider, first, the case of sensations, such as pain. It does seem that being 
conscious of one’s pain involves something other than being able to avow it, namely 
having the phenomenal quality of pain. I might be unable to avow or otherwise express 
it, but it seems that if I am in pain at all, I am also conscious of it. Again, the example of 
paralyzed and injured person developed above can serve as an illustration of such a 
situation. Although it does not seem counterintuitive that a person in that situation is not 
conscious of his beliefs, if he has any at all, it does seem counterintuitive that a person in 
pain is not conscious of his being in pain. Similar considerations can be applied to other 
passive occurrent mental states. 
 If this is so, my argument is 
unsound. 
In the case of mental acts the inability to express them is quite common, and one 
does not need to invent unusual counterexamples to illustrate it. Consider imaginings. I 
                                                 
32 Finkelstein 2003, 116. 
33 I am not saying that Finkelstein himself would subscribe to this argument, but this is something one can 
present as a defense of his position. 
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can lack words for the images I am now “producing” if, for example, I am trying to 
remember some object I saw but do not know how it is called. Yet I am surely conscious 
of such images. It is the same with some thoughts, as when I am trying to formulate 
something and still have not found the right expression to capture it. I can express a 
thought only after some efforts to formulate it, and these efforts are perfectly conscious. 
The same goes for intentional actions. If I am deeply involved in what I am doing, and 
especially if the action is complex and not habitual for me, I might be unable to say what 
exactly I am doing now until I spend some time in reflection. But of course I am 
conscious of what I am doing, and I am the more conscious the less simple and habitual 
the action is. Thus, as we see, in some cases consciousness and the ability to express are 
not the same, but actually impede each other. 
Thus, the ability to express mental states intentionally and, in particular, the 
ability to express them in self-ascriptions, is distinct from consciously knowing one’s 
own mental states. It is striking that the recent account of self-expression developed by 
Mitchell Green (which was to some extent used by Bar-On in her neo-expressivist 
account of self-knowledge) recognizes this: Green argues that only those states can be 
self-expressed that can be known by introspection.34 Whether they indeed can be known 
by introspection and not in some other way is, of course, the question under 
discussion,35
                                                 
34 Green 2007, 38-9. 
 but the claim that mental states can be self-expressed only if they can be 
known consciously is, I think, vindicated.  
35 Green is not engaged in the debates on self-knowledge, so it is not a problem for him. 
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Note, however, that my argument leaves open the question of self-knowledge of 
attitudes. For all I have said, the neo-expressivist account may still be onto something in 
this particular case. 
The first problem 
Criticism of the Rational Agency Approach 
the rational agency approach in the Moran’s version is that it can be 
applied only to a limited range of mental phenomena. Moran himself acknowledges that 
it is not suited for the explanation of passive occurrent mental states. However, even for 
the intentional attitudes for which the approach was designed, it is applicable only to 
some of them. Moran is aware that most of our attitudes are not formed by explicit 
rational deliberation. He argues that it is important that we have at least implicit reasons 
for holding them, so that a person, if asked to justify her attitude, can answer and provide 
these reasons. But it seems that we also have a special privilege with respect to attitudes 
for which we do not have rational justification.36 Sometimes we hold beliefs that are not 
justified by the evidence we have. An extreme case is obsessive attitudes of some 
pathological nature. A less unusual case includes various examples of unjustified 
prejudices, for example racist or nationalistic ones. All such attitudes not only are not 
typically formed via the process of explicit rational deliberation, but also
                                                 
36 Cf. Finkelstein 2003, 162 ff. 
 are not justified 
by any implicit reasons that can be adduced when the subject is asked why he holds 
them. This is so even for beliefs and intentions, which are the most convenient cases for 
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Moran. As for fears, desires, and so on, it is very easy to adduce multiple examples of 
irrational attitudes of these kinds. 
Another and the main problem of Moran’s approach is that it presupposes 
another kind of first-person knowledge, distinct both from self-knowledge with respect 
to our attitudes and self-knowledge with respect to our occurrent mental states, such as 
sensations and feelings. Namely, it presupposes knowledge of thoughts which we think 
during deliberation. It can be that we have, say, a rationally formed belief because in the 
deliberation we positively answered the question “is such-and-such the case?” But in 
order for us not only to have this belief, but also to know it, we need to know the answer 
which is the conclusion of our reasoning, and this answer is a thought. The same goes 
for the premises and for the intermediate conclusions we use in the deliberation: we 
should have self-knowledge of them to reach the final conclusion. Thus, we need to have 
self-knowledge of our thoughts in order to have self-knowledge of our rationally formed 
attitudes. 
These problems give Moran’s opponents a reason to charge him with a claim that 
he is really “engaged in a different explanatory project from proponents of the Epistemic 
Approach.”37
                                                 
37 Bar-On 2004, 143. 
 It is clear that the analysis of deliberative stance and transparency 
condition is important for understanding our practical life, perhaps for philosophy of 
action, but it is not clear whether this approach really explains self-knowledge. I will 
return to these problems in Chapter III. There I will try to vindicate the rational agency 
approach as an explanation of self-knowledge of one particular kind, at least to a certain 
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extent. I will also attempt to show wherein Moran’s mistake lies. Here I conclude that its 
limitations are larger than Moran acknowledges: not only this approach fails to explain 
self-knowledge we have with respect to our occurrent sensations and feelings, but also it 
cannot explain self-knowledge of our own thoughts, which is necessary for the formation 
of our attitudes, self-knowledge of which Moran purports to explain. As I will argue 
shortly, this is a consequence of Moran’s failure to account (and even to set a problem of 
accounting) for self-knowledge of our mental actions. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
DIFFERENT KINDS OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
Classification of the Objects of Self-Knowledge 
We have seen that there are serious objections to all of the discussed accounts of self-
knowledge. I contend that this fact is largely due to the tendency of authors to develop 
their accounts with preconceived assumptions or pretheoretical classifications of the 
phenomena with respect to which we have distinctive first-person knowledge. Thus, 
many of them start with the assumption that all these phenomena should be treated in the 
same way. This assumption is what Boyle called the Uniformity Assumption.38
                                                 
38 Boyle 2009, 141: “We could call this the Uniformity Assumption, for it amounts to the demand that a 
satisfactory account of our self-knowledge should be fundamentally uniform, explaining all cases of ‘first-
person authority’ in the same basic way.” 
 But there 
is a large variety of mental states, acts, events and attitudes, and it is far from obvious 
that first-person knowledge of all of them should be given essentially the same 
explanation. Are beliefs, sensations, feelings, moods, and thoughts really all alike? At 
least one should give an argument for the uniform approach to them. It is not a 
compelling argument that they all can be expressed in avowals, as Bar-On implies (even 
if they all really can be so expressed, for, as I already argued above, it does not seem 
natural to say, for example, that one can avow products of one’s imagination, if she lacks 
words for the images she produces). As Rödl observes, “that avowals share certain 
features requiring explanation does not entail that the explanation of these features is one 
for all avowals. It does not entail that the concept of avowal is suited for deployment in a 
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philosophical account of anything.”39 Much of the criticism adduced in Chapter II also 
suggests that those approaches, which seem to be at least reasonably successful in 
explaining knowledge of some kinds of mental phenomena, fail as soon as one attempts 
to stretch them so as to explain the whole range of these phenomena. 
Some authors, such as Moran, Boyle and Rödl (the last two – with an explicit 
reference to Kant) argue that the Uniformity Assumption is unjustified. As we remember, 
Moran suggested that different stories should be told about self-knowledge of passive 
occurrent mental states and self-knowledge of attitudes. Boyle and Rödl write about 
passive self-knowledge and active self-knowledge. However, while the views of these 
authors is much more satisfactory than the view based on the Uniformity Assumption, 
still they do not start with an attempt to observe the whole range of the relevant 
phenomena in order to classify their variety appropriately. These authors made a large 
step forward in rejecting the Uniformity Assumption, but still their subdivision of the 
kinds of self-knowledge was done without a full-fledged explicit discussion, and to start 
with some preconceived classification of phenomena is to leave out the possibility of 
errors. Of course, it is not necessary and is hardly possible to make all the relevant 
observations and classifications singlehandedly and from scratch, and what was already 
done by the authors writing on self-knowledge provides a good starting point. 
                                                 
39 Rödl 2007, 12. As I noticed in the relevant section, I think the concept of avowal is suited for a 
philosophical account of the communicative aspect of self-knowledge. However, it still does not help in 
answering the fundamental question. 
Fortunately, there are works where a considerable amount of classificatory work 
with respect to everything mental has been already done. Surprisingly enough, a lot was 
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done in a work which disputed the very idea of the mental, namely, in Ryle’s Concept of 
Mind. Ryle has done a good job of classifying and discussing certain aspects of our 
sentient and sapient life that can be with more or less good reason described as 
dispositions to do something. Indeed, Ryle manifested a remarkable ingenuity in this 
endeavor. But a lot can also be learned from what Ryle has not done, or from what is 
manifestly unsatisfactory or incomplete in his work. He has more or less succeeded in 
subsuming motives, inclinations, agitations, moods, many of intellectual capacities under 
the concept of disposition. His work might be considered as preparatory in that it allows 
us to separate the entities with respect to which we do not have distinctive self-
knowledge in a non-derivative way. As I will argue in the next section, this consideration 
allows us to modify Moran’s position so as to reply to the criticisms raised against him. 
However, an attentive reading of Ryle’s work also makes manifest that there are mental 
states that he failed to explain via the concept of disposition. These include at least 
sensations,40 occurrent feelings, imaginings,41 thoughts42
                                                 
40 In Chapter VII of his book Ryle gives a criticism of the concept of sensation, but even if this criticism is 
perfectly sound, what he really succeeds in is a refutation of certain epistemological doctrines which claim 
that we know external objects via the intermediary of something like “sense data” or “sensations” in the 
sense close to “sense data”. However, as Ryle himself notices (2002, 201) one may legitimately talk of 
such sensations as fatigue or pain. And it seems that we do have distinctive first-person knowledge of our 
pain. 
 and intentional actions (insofar 
as such actions involve knowledge of what one is doing). Moreover, it seems that at least 
some moods (such as sadness) and agitations (such as anger) do have a specific 
41 In Chapter VIII Ryle criticizes the idea of imaginings as “special pictures.” This, however, does not 
entail that there are no special mental processes we call “imaginings” and which we know with first-
person authority. Sartre in (1948) and (1962) also provides a devastating critique of associating 
imagination with sensation, but he also builds a positive theory of imagination. 
42 Ryle argues (Chapter IX) that we should not ascribe to our real thinking processes the names of their 
products, such as “judgments,” “inferences” and so on. This might be reasonable, but again, it does not 
show that there is no thinking. 
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phenomenology in addition to being able to manifest themselves in either specific 
actions or occurrent thoughts or feelings. These might be the intermediate cases between 
dispositional attitudes and occurrent states and mental actions. 
Now, we can reflect more on the occurrent states and actions listed above. Can 
we draw further distinctions between them that are relevant for our problem? I think we 
can. One such distinction is a distinction between passive occurrent states, such as 
feelings and sensations (and, perhaps, moods and agitations insofar as they include 
specific phenomenology), and mental actions (I will discuss what exactly counts as a 
mental actions in Chapter IV).43 Passive occurrent states are something that happen to us 
rather than something we do. With respect to them it does not seem at least prima facie 
inappropriate that we know them by observation, although perhaps not in quite the same 
way as we know external objects. By contrast, thoughts, imaginings, and intentional 
actions are something that we in some sense do, produce, or bring about, and it seems 
wrong to say that we know them by observation no matter how intimate or special the 
observational mechanism is. I will argue for this claim in Chapter IV. 
                                                 
43 Of course, this distinction roughly coincides with the distinction made by Boyle and Rödl, but, unlike 
them, I explicitly delineated dispositions. They need a separate account which I will provide in the next 
section. 
Thus, we have distinguished three main categories: passive occurrent states, 
mental actions, and attitudes. These categories are all distinct in the aspect which 
interests us, and different (although it does not mean unrelated) explanations should be 
given to each. I will now consider attitudes and will argue that both Moran’s and neo-
expressivists’ approaches are helpful in explaining self-knowledge of them. 
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As I will argue here, we have self-knowledge with respect to our attitudes only in a 
derivative way, while the basic kinds of self-knowledge are knowledge of passive 
occurrent mental states and knowledge of mental acts. The understanding of this fact 
enables us to solve at least some problems of Moran’s view. 
Self-Knowledge of Our Attitudes 
As we saw in Chapter II, Moran claimed that even if we do not actually form 
beliefs or other attitudes by deliberation, it is important that we can at least give reasons 
why we hold it. Now, as I have shown, the wide-spread criticism of his view is that there 
are attitudes which we cannot justify, and yet of which we still have privileged first-
person knowledge. For example, there are attitudes which are not sensitive to one’s 
reasoning at all. Moran argues that such attitudes are in some important sense 
“alienated” from us, but this point does not really answer the criticism. I suggest that we 
look at such attitudes without preconceived opinions and see how we really get 
knowledge of them. Consider some unjustified belief, a belief that p. What makes it 
“alienated” is that even though I do not have arguments for it and, perhaps, I even know 
arguments against it, I still cannot help believing it. It resists my ability to change it via 
rational deliberation. An example of such a belief is a father’s belief that his son will 
return from the war even if that war ended some years ago, and all the evidence points to 
the conclusion that he will not return. No matter what reasons are considered by the 
father, he persists in his belief that his son will return. In this sense it is recalcitrant to 
reasons. However, there are no apparent reasons to deny that he has self-knowledge with 
respect to this belief. 
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Thus, while Moran’s account works with respect to rationally formed beliefs, it 
does not explain self-knowledge of “recalcitrant” beliefs and other kinds of attitudes. 
What I suggest is to use as a primary model for explanation not a rationally formed 
belief, but an attitude that is not formed by deliberation, perhaps even one which is 
insensitive to reasoning. If I will be able to provide an account of self-knowledge of such 
attitudes, it will be relatively easy to explain the role of rational deliberation when there 
is such rational deliberation. 
When do I realize that I have an attitude in the first place? I think the answer is:  
when someone (perhaps, myself) asks me whether I believe that p or when I encounter 
another situation which forces me to use this belief consciously, that is to say, to express 
it either verbally or in an intentional action. Rationally formed beliefs are the result of 
conscious and active deliberation. Some beliefs which we do not form via explicit 
deliberation are still not alienated, because the process of their formation was at least 
partly within our view, as it were. For instance, we could check arguments for and 
against them at least from time to time, at least to some extent. By contrast, the 
formation of other kinds of attitudes is done “behind the scene,” without a possibility of 
our conscious intervention. Because of that we do not even know that we hold this or 
that particular belief until we encounter a situation in which we are forced to make a 
judgment or an action which reveals whether we have this belief. 
This conclusion is even more evident in the case of other attitudes. Consider 
some irrational phobia, for example the fear of spiders. How can I possibly get 
knowledge that I fear spiders until I encounter one? Again, I can get this knowledge only 
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when I encounter a situation that will show me that I have this fear. Similarly, an 
irrational desire will show itself to me when I either perceive the desired object or think 
about it. A perception or a thought will give me occasion to come to know that I have a 
desire for an object in question. Otherwise it is not clear how I can know that I have this 
desire. 
One can say that attitudes give rise to behavior associated with them, and that in 
order to understand that we have, for example, fears or desires, we have to reflect on our 
behavior. The stronger the attitude, the stronger motive it will create for our behavior 
and the easier it will be to notice its influence and to get knowledge of it. But, of course, 
this kind of knowledge is not specifically first-personal and anyone other than the person 
who has the attitude can make the same observations and inferences as that person. This 
point might suggest, in line with Moran, that our “alienated” attitudes are indeed on par 
with external objects with regard to first-person knowledge. 
However, I think that many attitudes, especially such as fears or desires, not only 
incline us to certain behavior, but also have specific phenomenology associated with 
them. We all know specific cramps of fear or urges of desire, and these cramps or urges 
are indeed something only we can know about ourselves. Thus, after all there is 
privileged first-person knowledge associated with our attitudes, but it is not knowledge 
of our attitudes as such, but only of phenomenology associated with them. Attitudes 
themselves are dispositions rather than objects that can somehow be perceived. As I 
already noticed, it is plausible that there are also intermediate cases between 
dispositional attitudes and occurrent mental states, for instance agitations and moods. 
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This fact, however, does not threaten the main line of my reasoning: the explanation of 
first-person knowledge with respect to such cases will simply include features of the 
explanation of passive occurrent states. 
So far I have considered irrational attitudes. But what about those attitudes which 
are actively formed by deliberation or at least more or less “under our control”? I think 
that the crucial conclusion still applies to them with one important addition. These 
attitudes also manifest themselves in thoughts or in the behavior consistent with them in 
situations which show us that we have them. But these attitudes are also the result of our 
deliberation, that is, of thinking. Thus, we have a distinctive first-person relation with 
respect to these attitudes in a way derivative from our first-person relation to our 
thinking with which we formed these attitudes. Thus, we have first-person knowledge 
with respect to rationally formed attitudes in the following ways: 1) insofar as we can 
express them in our thoughts and intentional behavior in accordance with them; 2) 
insofar as we form them by explicit deliberation; 3) insofar as these attitudes have 
characteristic phenomenology associated with them. Of course, we can sometimes think 
that we believe in something without really believing it, and we can also think that we 
formed a belief or an intention rationally, while it was really acquired by us for some 
unjustified reasons, and we only later provided a rationalization for it. For these reasons 
self-knowledge of our attitudes is not as reliable as self-knowledge of our mental acts 
and passive occurrent states. Nevertheless, such self-knowledge is still distinct from 
knowledge we have of external objects and states of affairs. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN ACTIONS 
The considerations developed above suggest that there are two basic non-derivative 
kinds of self-knowledge: knowledge of passive occurrent states, such as sensation and 
feelings, and knowledge of our own actions. In this work I will not deal with the first 
kind of self-knowledge in any detail; I will only say that it is at least plausible that some 
sort of observational or introspective account may be adequate for treating knowledge of 
sensations and feelings.44
 
 In the rest of the work I will be discussing self-knowledge of 
our actions. I will argue that we possess a faculty distinct from perception which 
provides us with knowledge of our agency. First, however, I will have a few things to 
say about the historical background for such a claim. 
A number of authors have suggested that we know our actions non-observationally. The 
most notable historical examples include Johann Gottlieb Fichte and G.E.M. Anscombe; 
in our own time Christopher Peacocke has recently developed the basics of epistemology 
of what he calls “action awareness.” In this section I will discuss the views of Fichte and 
Anscombe, since their treatment of the question provides, in my view, the essential 
elements of the account we need. 
Agency and Self-Knowledge: Some History 
                                                 
44 For some good arguments in favor of this view one can go to the article of A. Zimmerman “Self-
Knowledge: Rationalism vs. Empiricism,” which also agrees with my approach in distinguishing different 
kinds of self-knowledge, albeit only two kinds. 
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Some of the contemporary authors who work on self-knowledge have referred to 
Kant for his distinctions of the “inner sense” and “apperception” which, on their view, 
provides the framework for the development of a non-uniform account of self-
knowledge.45 Apperception is, for them, a prototype of the kind of self-knowledge we 
have of ourselves as agents. While I completely agree that this is the most fruitful line of 
thought on the matter, the problem is how to understand this apperception. Kant himself, 
for instance, held that we do not possess knowledge via apperception. In the first 
Critique he claimed that the “I think” of apperception is not an intuition but a thought (B 
157). Elsewhere46 Kant has argued that mere thinking does not amount to experience. 
Thus, it does not give us experience of ourselves but merely ascribes all our experience 
to formally the same subject without telling us anything about that subject.47
Fichte, however, did affirm that we have self-knowledge of ourselves as 
spontaneous, acting subjects. On his account we know it via what he called “intellectual 
intuition.” He defines and characterizes it as follows:  
 
“Intellectual intuition” is the immediate consciousness that I act and of 
what I do when I act. It is because of this that it is possible for me to know 
something because I do it. That we possess intellectual intuition is not 
something that can be demonstrated by means of concepts, nor can an 
understanding of what intellectual intuition is be produced from concepts. 
This is something everyone has to discover immediately within himself; 
otherwise, he will never become acquainted with it at all… 
…I cannot take a single step, I cannot move my hand or foot, without the 
intellectual intuition of my self-consciousness in these actions… Only in this 
way am I able to distinguish my own acting (and, within this acting, my own 
                                                 
45 See Boyle 2009. 
46 In the Reflexion 5661. 
47 Beiser 2002, 301. 
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self) from the encountered object of this activity. Every person who ascribes 
activity to himself appeals to this intuition.48
We see that Fichte characterizes intellectual intuition as immediate, i.e., non-
conceptual.
 
49
Moreover, I cannot discover myself to be acting unless I also construct an 
image or a picture of what it is I want to produce [by acting], which image I 
also grasp by means of a concept. For how do I know what it is I want to 
produce? How could I possibly know this unless I had immediately observed 
myself engaged in the act of constructing a concept of a goal, that is, in a type 
of acting?
 Further in the text he specifies that, as with sensory perception, this non-
conceptual content has to be “grasped by means of concepts” in a way similar to how 
ordinary sensations are conceptualized. It is impossible to simply demonstrate or explain 
what it is since it is a sui generis kind of experience, and experience is to be “discovered 
immediately” before any meaningful reasoning about it is possible. According to Fichte 
it is only via intellectual intuition that we recognize something as our own activity. In 
the passage cited he refers only to bodily movements; however, later in the text he 
writes:  
50
Thus, quite sensibly, Fichte includes mental actions such as imagining something in the 
domain of what is known via intellectual intuition. 
 
Overall, since he actually gives place to the kind of knowledge of our own 
actions distinct from perceptual knowledge, I think that Fichte is a better historical ally 
than Kant for those who want to introduce knowledge provided by our mental agency 
itself. 
 
                                                 
48 Fichte 1994, 46-7. 
49 Cf. Beiser 2002, 298 
50 Fichte 1994, 47. 
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In her book Intention G.E.M. Anscombe was primarily concerned with bodily 
intentional actions. As well as Fichte, she has suggested that one knows one’s own 
actions non-observationally, and she has claimed that there are two kinds of knowledge: 
speculative or contemplative knowledge which is true when it is in accordance with 
facts; and practical knowledge, for which this correspondence goes the other way 
around.51
Anscombe has also argued that to understand practical knowledge we need to 
understand practical reasoning,
 Correlatively, a mistake in the first case would be one of judgment, that is to 
say, would be made because one got the facts independent from him wrong. In the 
second case, as Anscombe writes citing Theophrastus, “the mistake is in the 
performance,” i.e. in the failure to realize one’s intention. 
52
To sum up our historical excursus, the account of the knowledge of our actions 
suggested by Fichte and Anscombe includes the following essential claims: 
 and it seems that Moran’s account of self-knowledge is 
an attempt to work out this connection. I have argued above, however, that while there is 
a lot valuable in Moran’s account, it is misguided if it is understood as the whole story 
about self-knowledge we have with respect to our activity as rational agents. Thus, this 
remark of Anscombe might lead to confusion. 
(1) We possess a source of knowledge different in kind from perception 
(intellectual intuition or practical knowledge). 
                                                 
51 Anscombe 2000, 56-7. There are similar remarks in Fichte as well. Cf. Fichte 1994, 44: “It is so, 
because I make it so.” 
52 Anscombe 2000, 57. 
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(2) This knowledge tells us of our own agency; moreover, it allows us to 
recognize our actions as our actions in the first place. 
(3) The truth of the judgments made on the basis of this kind of knowledge is 
dependent not on the accurate perception of facts independent from subject 
but on his own bringing about of the facts mentioned in these judgments, 
which do not exist prior to the subject’s activity. 
I will argue that this account is by and large correct. To do this I will criticize the 
rival accounts of knowledge of our own actions and then will discuss the view itself, 
trying to make it sound less extravagant than it does, especially in Fichte. First, however, 
I will discuss some fruitful objections to it, which question the necessity of the claims 
(1) and (2) and thus attempt to undermine the whole account. 
 
Overt Bodily Actions and Self-Awareness 
Insofar as bodily actions are concerned, the account suggested above might be criticized 
in a number of ways. First, one might argue that while we do indeed have a kind of 
knowledge of our own actions which no one else in fact has, this is due simply to our 
proprioceptive capacities. Proprioception is surely something we have only with respect 
to our own body and thus first-personal, but it might be argued that proprioception is 
merely another kind of perception, and thus our knowledge of our bodily actions is, after 
all, of an observational kind, which is contingently such that it provides us with 
knowledge only about our own bodies. To illustrate the contingency of the distinctively 
first-personal character of proprioceptive knowledge we can conceive of someone else’s 
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brain being so hooked up to my body that she will get proprioceptive knowledge of the 
position and movements of my limbs.53
Second, another possibility to criticize the account which favors non-
observational character of knowledge of our own bodily actions is opened by the so-
called ecological approach to perception, developed by James Gibson (1979) and further 
elaborated with the problems of self-knowledge in view, for instance, by 
 
Jose Bermudez 
(1998) and Johannes Roessler (2003). The important idea of Gibson was that our visual 
perception gives us not only exterospecific information, that is, information about our 
environment, but also propriospecific information, i.e. information about ourselves. This 
information is revealed, in particular, in the boundedness of the field of vision, the 
constant presence of some parts of our bodies in our field of vision, visual kinesthesis 
and so-called affordances, that is, possibilities for perceiving subject’s actions latent in 
the environment. These last two sources of self-knowledge should be clarified, 
especially given that they are important in providing knowledge of our actions. Visual 
kinesthesis has to do with motion perception. The idea is that during motion the relations 
between variant and invariant features of visual perception “make available information 
about the movement of the perceiver, as well as about the environment.”54
                                                 
53 Cf. Bar-On 2004, 100. 
 The theory of 
“affordances” suggests that possibilities of various bodily actions that animals can make 
in their environments are not inferred from the content of their perception, but are 
directly perceived. Thus, the ecological view rejects the view of perception on which we 
(and other animals) perceive physical objects in a way which is neutral with respect to 
54 Bermudez 1998, 110. 
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the range of possible actions of perceivers. Johannes Roessler uses this approach to 
challenge what he sees as an objectionable assumption that underlies Anscombe’s view 
that there are two kinds of knowledge involved in intentional action, which was 
expounded above. Roessler argues that what drives Anscombe to introduce the non-
perceptual kind of knowledge is her acceptance of the unsophisticated view of 
perception which the ecological view rejects. On his view, the ecological view provides 
an account of perception which allows us to perceive our actions not merely qua bodily 
movements, whose descriptions alone are neutral with respect to any intention that 
governs these movements, but qua actions. 
To illustrate his argument, Roessler uses examples such as driving the car (this 
one is borrowed from Gibson). While driving, I am looking at the road with a different 
attitude than a passenger of that same car does. I am not merely observing the road signs 
and junctures; rather, I am looking, for example, “to see when to turn left.”55 That is to 
say, I am looking at the road not as a passive observer, but as an agent, “from within the 
act.”56
While both of these sources of self-knowledge—proprioception and perception as 
it is understood by the ecological approach—are important and, no doubt, should be 
integrated into any comprehensive account of knowledge of our own actions, I think that 
it can be persuasively argued that there is a yet further source of action awareness. In the 
case of intentional overt bodily actions this source has to do with intentional component 
of the action. If, as Sebastian Rödl puts it, action is a movement that rests on a thought, 
 Accordingly, I perceive myself as an agent who operates in this action. 
                                                 
55 Roessler 2003, 392. 
56 See, for example, Roessler 2003, 398. 
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then it is this thought that underlies an action (and which is, according to both Rödl and 
Anscombe, a conclusion of practical reasoning) that interests us here. However, to make 
the necessity of the treatment of this additional source of self-knowledge especially 
conspicuous, I will hereunder discuss specifically mental actions, in which neither 
proprioception nor visual perception are involved at all. 
 
Mental Actions: Some Preliminaries 
Intuitively it seems that we are active with respect to a certain part of our mental life. It 
seems that there are some things that we do rather than just happen to us. However, what 
exactly is the scope of mental agency is not so clear. Thus, before considering whether 
we do indeed have a special source of knowledge—that which springs from our agency 
itself—we need to specify what exactly will count as a mental action. 
Christopher Peacocke, one of the contemporary authors who advocate the idea of 
non-perceptual action awareness, claims that, among other things, judgments and 
formations of intentions are actions.57 Recently Galen Strawson has argued that the 
scope of mental action is, actually, quite restrictive.58
                                                 
57 See Peacocke 2009, passim. 
 He argued that it comes down to 
the performance of “prefatory” and “catalytic” functions. Thus, on his account only such 
acts as setting one’s mind at some problem, refreshing images, rehearsing formulas and 
the like would really be mental actions (231-2), whereas such things as judgments or 
deciding to do something are not. In short, “there is very little action in mental life” 
(244). 
58 Strawson 2003. 
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Strawson has a point here. He is correct in that such things as formations of 
beliefs, at least in the vast majority of cases, are not mental actions, although the 
observation that beliefs cannot be formed at will is by no means new.59
However, such authors as 
 Strawson also 
seems to be right that remembering something is not a mental action: at least one cannot 
intend to remember a specific thing since in order to intend that one would have already 
to remember the thing in question. Perhaps, many cases of deciding something, i.e., 
merely acquiring a certain intention without an explicit exercise of choice, also happen 
to us rather than are done by us. 
Andrei Buckareff (2005) and Alfred Mele (2009) have 
contended that Strawson has made an exaggeration. Buckareff claimed that Strawson failed 
to provide any criterion by which mental actions can be distinguished from nonactional 
mental events (84), and that “a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is 
actional” (83). As an example he argues that doing mental arithmetic is an action (85), 
with which Mele agrees. Indeed, for example, to multiply two- or three-digit numbers 
most people will need to do a number of actions, such as multiplying digits of one 
number by the other number in turn, then adding them, perhaps also rounding numbers 
in the beginning to facilitate calculations and also holding the intermediate results in 
short-term memory.60
                                                 
59 See, for example, Williams 1973. 
 All these manipulations require attention, concentration, guidance, 
and can be done at will. And they are not merely catalysts or prefatory actions but the 
essential constituents of the calculation itself. Thus, Strawson is, indeed, exaggerating. 
60 Cf. Mele 2009, 32. 
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Unlike Strawson, Buckareff and Mele do provide a criterion by which we can 
distinguish mental actions from nonactional mental events. Simply put, a (mental) action 
is something one can try to do, where trying is making an effort to do that action.61 In 
other words, mental action is something one can do just because one has reasons to do 
it.62 On this account such mental events as thinking a particular thought or remembering 
something are, indeed, not mental actions, since one cannot try to do them. This is so 
because in order to try to do something, one has to have the content of what one is going 
to do already in her mind. There is no problem here with overt bodily actions, for it is 
typical for bodily actions that one understands what she wants to do before the attempt to 
do it. But it is not so with thinking and remembering, since if one already has the content 
of a thought or a proposition to remember in her mind, she has already thought or 
remembered it. One probably cannot also make a judgment at will since, as Strawson 
and many others correctly argue, they are in normal cases governed by evidence and 
logical laws and not by our will. One can, however, try to bring about such nonactional 
mental events by mental actions proper.63
Mental actions proper include Strawson’s examples such as drawing attention to 
a problem, setting one’s mind and so on, but are not limited to these. They also include 
such genuine actions as doing calculations in one’s mind, making assumptions, and 
imaginings, although these latter involve the operations of non-voluntary mechanisms 
which provide us with quasi-sensory content itself, as Strawson points out.
  
64
                                                 
61 Buckareff 2005, 85; Mele 2009, 18. 
 All of these 
62 Or something that is “responsive to practical reasons,” see Dorsch 2009. 
63 Mele 2009, 19. 
64 Strawson 2003, 239-42. 
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one can do at will without mediation by other actions that will lead to their obtaining. 
One qualification is in order here. It seems that such actions as imagining or making 
assumptions do not admit the possibility of failure, and thus the very concept of trying is 
also problematic with respect to such actions.65 Then one can argue that they should not 
even be called actions on Buckareff’s and Mele’s criterion. Still, making assumptions 
and some imaginings clearly seem to be something that we do rather than something that 
just happens to us. It is possible to respond to this problem in at least two ways. One can 
either substitute willing for trying in the criterion of whether something is an action 
provided above. Then a (mental) action is something one can will to do, where willing, 
unlike trying, does not necessarily admit the possibility of failure.66
I think that such non-momentary actions as listening and watching can also be 
regarded as mental actions, since in these cases one needs to sustain constantly one’s 
attention on the source of auditory or visual information respectively and sustaining 
one’s attention seems to be an exercise of will, something that one can intend, try to do, 
that is responsive to practical reasons.
 It is crucial that 
willing (and, which is more clear, trying) are not themselves actions (or else an infinite 
regress is threatening) but, rather, constitutive aspects of intentional actions. Those who 
object to the notion of willing can insist that there is a conceptual possibility of failure in 
such actions as imagining or making an assumption, but we are so skillful in these 
actions that in practice it does not really arise. 
67
                                                 
65 O’Shaughnessy 2009 also considers actions for which the concept of trying seems to be inapplicable. 
 For the illustration of this claim the reader can 
66 O’Shaughnessy goes in this direction, see 2009, 171-2. 
67 Cf. Crowther 2009. 
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think about listening to someone who is speaking in a foreign language to which the 
listener is not quite accustomed or to keeping track of the conversation in a place where 
loud music is playing. 
Such processes as mental reasoning might be considered as complex actions. 
Although the content of thoughts which come to mind during reasoning as well as many 
of the transitions between thoughts, such as logical inferences, is not something 
determined voluntarily, reasoning as a whole is something one can try to do and succeed 
(or fail68). Such complex actions are similar to overt actions, which also involve much of 
what is not under an agent’s control.69
The question whether judgments are mental actions, as Peacocke suggests, or 
whether they are just passive acquisitions of beliefs, as Strawson, Mele and Dorsch 
 For instance, any overt action involves certain 
physiological processes in the organism. Yet if we are willing to call a voluntary bodily 
movement an action, reasoning initiated and sustained by an agent should be considered 
as an action too. Similar considerations should be applied to imaginings: while Strawson 
seems to be right that particular quasi-sensory content that arises after we make an 
attempt to imagine some object is not something we bring about voluntarily, this alone 
does not suffice to deny imagining the status of a mental action. There is plenty of 
genuine agential activity involved in the act of imagining: setting one’s attention to do it, 
sustaining it, and sometimes, when the quasi-sensory content appears, manipulating it in 
various ways. 
                                                 
68 What exactly a failure to reason is is not a simple matter. One sense of failure to reason is failure to 
reason correctly. Another sense, which Buckareff points out (88), is failure to reason about the specific 
content one intended to reason about. 
69 Buckareff 2005, 86. 
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(2009) think, is a difficult one. The standard argument for the claim that judgments are 
not actions is that they cannot be done at will since genuine judgments are supposed to 
be governed by evidence or, in general, by truth-related norms, and not by our will. If 
this is correct, then our agency with respect to judgments extends only to the preliminary 
and facilitatory conditions, such as keeping one’s attention on the subject matter of 
thinking. However, I think there is one more sense in which judgments (and, for that 
matter, instances of reasoning such as inferences) are actions. Often we acquire new 
beliefs not merely by observing something and letting the evidence work on us (with all 
the facilitatory activity included) but by doing reasoning in either overt or private 
speech. Moreover, these utterances we do in public or sotto voce are, as it were, vehicles 
of our thought.70
 
 It is not always the case that we would have made the same judgments 
were we not uttering those phrases-vehicles. But clearly the utterances are as such 
actions, and those made sotto voce are mental actions. Thus, at least judgments made, as 
it were, in verbal garments, perhaps could be considered to be mental actions. However, 
judgments considered as acquisitions of beliefs are not actions. Neither are thoughts in 
the sense of entertaining new thought content, as Strawson correctly argues. 
Criticism of the Rival Accounts 
In this section I will consider a number of possible accounts of knowledge of our own 
mental actions. Some of these coincide with the views already criticized in Chapter II, 
but since there I have shown only that these accounts cannot function as explanations of 
                                                 
70 For this idea see Soteriou 2009, 242. 
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self-knowledge of the whole range of the entities with respect to which we have self-
knowledge, it is still to be shown that they are inadequate for the explanation of self-
knowledge strictly of mental actions. I will consider (a) the observational or perceptual 
model of self-knowledge of mental actions; (b) the account which grounds self-
knowledge of mental actions in inference of mental states, and (c) the prompting model. 
I will argue that all these accounts are inadequate. This result will open a way for the 
acceptance of the view that self-knowledge of mental actions is obtained via the source 
of knowledge that is parallel to and independent from sense perception, which grounds 
the rationality of this kind of knowledge. In the section 5 I will consider this source more 
closely.71
 
 
The Observational Account 
The observational account of our knowledge of our mental actions will have it, as in the 
case with self-knowledge in general, that there is some very reliable perceptual “faculty” 
or “mechanism” that has our mental actions as its objects. One problem in the case of 
mental actions is the same that I indicated in Chapter II as a problem of the epistemic 
approach generally. Knowledge obtained via observation is always based on a prior 
identification of the object of observation. That is, if I predicate some property, say, 
color, of some object, say, a table, I need first to identify the object as a table. If I 
predicate something of myself, and if the judgment in which I make this predication is 
based on observation, I need to identify what I observe as related to myself. For 
                                                 
71 For both this strategy and for many of the arguments of this section I am heavily indebted to Dorsch 
2009 and O’Brien 2003 articles. 
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example, I can attribute some physical characteristics to myself on the basis of 
observation. However, in the case of mental action we do not actually first identify 
something (whatever that may be) as our self, and then attribute a mental action to it. 
 Because self-ascriptions of mental actions are not based on identification, they 
enjoy what Shoemaker called immunity to error through misidentification. This 
immunity means that if my self-ascription is mistaken, it cannot be such because it is not 
I but someone else is doing the action in question. By contrast, in other cases I can see 
someone performing an action, make a mistaken judgment that X is performing that 
action, where mistake is due to the wrong identification of an agent as X. Again, one can 
answer this line of criticism by resorting to some version of the Cartesian view and 
arguing that only one self can be observed by each of us, and thus no identification is 
necessary. In this case such an answer is hard to refute conclusively, but there are at least 
two problems with it, which weaken it. First, it saddles its proponents with the dualistic 
view, to which most of the contemporary philosophers will raise objections on the 
grounds other than the problem of self-knowledge. Second, it precludes a uniform 
explanation of self-knowledge of mental actions and self-knowledge of bodily actions. 
For, in the case of bodily actions it is not only one self that can be observed as 
performing an action. Admittedly, this whole line of criticism is less than decisive, and 
yet I think it undermines the appeal of the observational account of knowledge of mental 
actions. 
Another problem of the observational account is that it seems that when we make 
an assumption, imagine something, or try to listen to something while sustaining our 
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attention, the object of our attention is not the mental action which we do but the object 
of that mental action. But it seems that any kind of perception draws on the resources of 
attention. However, mental actions draw attention to themselves. Thus, if we had a 
perceptual faculty with which we observe our mental actions, it would compete with our 
actions themselves for the resources of attention. And so we would be the less effective 
in our mental actions the more aware we are about them. However, it seems that we do 
know about an action in which we are involved apart from knowledge obtained by 
second-order reflection upon our actions. And this former kind of knowledge does not 
seem to compete with the effectiveness of those actions. For instance, when one is 
carefully listening to someone else’s speech, the listener knows well that he is listening 
in a way that does not impede the effectiveness of his listening, although an attempt to 
say that would  indeed impede his listening. 
 
The Inference Account 
Another way to account for knowledge of our own mental actions is to suggest that we 
arrive at this knowledge via inference. Suppose that one tries to imagine some scenery, 
and then that scenery appears “in his mind’s eye.” If she were introspectively aware of 
her intention, retained the memory of that intention, then became aware of the scenery 
which appeared “in her mind’s eye” and, moreover, noticed that these events are 
temporally ordered in the right way and that her imagery matched her prior intention, she 
can make an inference that the relationship between the intention and the resultant 
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imagery is not accidental. She can further infer that it was her intention that was at least 
part of the cause of the appearance of the image.72
This account faces a number of difficulties. First, as Dorsch notices, it puts too 
high requirements on the agent that she must satisfy in order to know her mental actions 
as actions and not as mere happenings. In particular, it suggests that only those agents 
who possess the concepts of temporal order, accidental/non-accidental relationships or 
something of this kind can know their agency. Yet it is plausible that such demands are 
not satisfied by many subjects who do possess awareness of their agency, such as 
children or (some) teenagers. And it is implausible that any inference account is able to 
weaken these requirements enough to solve this problem. 
 
Second, the inference view simply does not correspond to our phenomenology of 
mental actions. It does not seem that we ever actually do make any inferences like those 
suggested in the account; it seems that our awareness of our agency is much more 
immediate. As Dorsch argues, perhaps we do make similar inferences in some very 
special circumstances, but not in the normal cases. 
In addition, the particular example which I have just considered highlights an 
additional problem. If we did not know immediately that images produced by our 
imagination are our own creations, it seems that we would have to face them first as 
indistinguishable from perceptions and to recognize them as images only later. But, as 
Sartre has convincingly argued, in this case we would not have satisfactory means to 
make those distinctions in many cases and thus would be doomed to confuse images 
                                                 
72 Dorsch 2009, 59. 
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with perceptions pretty often, the situation which we do not in fact observe.73
 
 It suffices 
to say that in normal circumstances we do not in fact experience ourselves as 
considering whether something is a perception or an image, and thus the question of 
criteria for distinguishing them does not even arises. 
The Prompting Model 
The prompting model suggests that judgments about the nature of our mental episodes 
that establish whether they were brought about by us or not are “prompted by simply 
paying attention to the issue, or asking oneself how a certain present mental episode has 
been formed.”74
                                                 
73 Sartre 1948, 95-101. 
 This view seems close to my own account of self-knowledge of our 
attitudes developed in Chapter III above. However, in the case of attitudes my account 
actually combined prompting with inference: on my account occasions in which one’s 
attitudes are exercised provide us rational basis for inference that we have those 
attitudes. If the same strategy is used in the case of our mental actions, then we are back 
to the inference account. But I have already argued that in the case of mental actions as 
opposed to the case of attitudes (whose knowledge is, on my view, not as immediate) 
this account does not work. But the proponent of the prompting model does not 
necessarily have to go that way. He might suggest that the higher-order judgments about 
our mental actions are prompted by some merely reliable causal mechanism which 
operates on the sub-personal level, while there are no rational relations between our 
mental actions and our judgments about them. This is, of course, a restricted version of 
74 Dorsch 2009, 59. 
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the “no reasons model,” that is, the view that some class of judgments (in the present 
case judgments about our mental actions) is not rationally grounded at all. 
As in the case with self-knowledge in general, the “no reasons model” has a 
problem common to any reliabilist account that our higher-order judgments about our 
mental actions will be rationally ungrounded and hence appear to be irrationally held. If 
one is opposed to reliabilist approach in general, one would need to make a compelling 
argument why this approach can be used only in the particular case of knowledge of our 
mental actions and not in other cases. 
Let us suppose, however, either that the proponent of the “no reasons model” is 
not opposed to reliabilism in general or that he is able to provide such an argument. Still, 
this account faces the same problem in the case of mental actions as in the general case 
(discussed in Chapter II): it does seem that mental action have certain phenomenal 
quality (“actish phenomenal quality,” as Carl Ginet called it), that is, there is something 
it is “like” to be engaged in action rather than to experience something passively. For 
example, it seems that there is an experiential difference between actively drawing one’s 
attention to some sensation in the body and an involuntary switch of attention to the 
same sensation. Furthermore, it seems that this phenomenal quality can serve as a reason 
for self-ascribing an action to oneself. 
Can one then claim that our higher-order judgments about mental actions are 
constitutive of our mental actions themselves? This claim is problematic, for it seems 
that children acquire the ability to self-ascribe their mental actions later than they acquire 
the ability to perform them. Perhaps another case when one is doing mental actions and 
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is not aware that one is can be encountered in some forms of schizophrenia. Some of the 
patients who suffer from it report the phenomenon of the so-called thought insertion, 
when they do not recognize their thoughts as their own.75
Thus, I have argued that we do not know our own mental actions via observation 
or inference; and the “no reasons view” does not seem to be right either. Of course, no 
list of the possible accounts can be declared to be exhaustive on a priori grounds. 
However, since I do not know of other plausible rival accounts, I will assume that I have 
made a good argument for the view that our knowledge of our own mental actions is of a 
sui generis non-observational and yet rational kind. 
 
 
Self-Knowledge of Mental Actions: More Details 
Thus, since the rival accounts fail, it can be reasonably concluded that the best account 
of our knowledge of our own mental actions should rest on the acknowledgement of the 
existence of a source of knowledge independent from perception. This is just the claim 
(1) which I extracted from the accounts of Fichte and Anscombe (see the first section of 
this chapter). In the rest of the work I will, following Peacocke (2009), call it “action 
awareness.” 
The claim (2), that is, that it is this action awareness that allows us to distinguish 
what is our actions from what merely happens to us seems to be also warranted by the 
preceding considerations. While it can be argued that proprioception and the “outer 
senses” (provided that one will accept the ecological approach to perception) allow us to 
                                                 
75 Some discussion of these cases in relation to the problem of mental action can be founded in Proust 
2009. 
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single out movements produced by us, it is not clear how else we distinguish, say, those 
thoughts or images that just come and go in our minds from those we deliberately 
produced or at least helped to obtain. The alternative accounts appeared to be untenable 
or at least weak. 
The claim (3) has to do with mistakes which can occur in the exercise of action 
awareness. Recall that at this point Anscombe wrote that “the mistake is not one of 
judgment but of performance.” The problems of the sui generis kind of mistakes 
associated with action awareness are interesting, and I will discuss it in the rest of this 
section. The underlying idea that I will use to explicate these issues is that there is a 
connection between self-knowledge of our actions and practical knowledge in the 
ordinary sense of skill. The possibility of such a connection was, perhaps, suggested (if 
not quite explicitly) by Anscombe herself,76
I think that in order to understand what a “mistake of performance” is it is worth 
to consider some criticism first. Indeed, are there mistakes of performance as opposed to 
 and it is currently discussed by some 
contemporary authors. However, I have doubts that it is quite intelligible to apply the 
concept of skill to all, especially the basic, mental actions. Therefore, I would like to 
indicate that what follows is only a tentative attempt to follow along these lines. Even if 
the account to be developed cannot be stretched to basic mental actions, it may indicate 
that there is a yet additional source of self-knowledge of ordinary bodily actions and, 
perhaps, some of the more complex mental actions (such as mental calculations). I will 
use as examples primarily the cases of bodily actions. 
                                                 
76 Anscombe 2000, 88-9. 
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mistakes of judgments? Laurence Houlgate has suggested that what Anscombe called by 
this name is actually analyzable either in terms of mistakes of judgment upon which an 
agent unsuccessfully acts, or in terms of accidents that interfere with her performance 
and cause failures of her actions.77 For instance, to use Anscombe’s own examples, 
suppose a man has bought food in a supermarket according to the shopping list. 
Suppose, further, that he has made a mistake and bought margarine instead of butter. 
Houlgate argues that this mistake was based upon a mistake of judgment, namely upon a 
misreading of the relevant item in the list, or on forgetting, or on missing that item. In 
another example where a man turns right on the road after receiving a command to turn 
left, his mistake is based either on his misunderstanding of the command or on the 
confusion of his right hand with his left or on something similar, that is, on some 
mistake of judgment (we are also supposing that he has not ignored, disregarded or 
disobeyed the order, as Anscombe insisted). Another possibility of failure of 
performance is, according to Houlgate, connected with an occurrence of some accident. 
For instance, if a man has fired at a wild pigeon and a homing pigeon flew into his line 
of fire, this is an accident and not a mistake at all. The rejection of a sui generis mistake 
of performance, then, depends on a claim that “unless we thought that there was an error 
of judgment… we could not describe the case as any sort of mistake.”78
Notice that Houlgate did not provide an argument for this claim. Thus, his 
rejection of mistakes of performance is essentially question-begging, since he is relying 
on the premise that the only kind of mistake we ascribe to people includes mistakes of 
 
                                                 
77 Houlgate 1966. 
78 Ibid., 260. 
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judgment. Still, it is a task of a practical knowledge theorist to explicate the notion of 
mistake of performance and to argue that it is not reducible to mistakes of judgment. 
Let us first discuss what the possibilities of failure in performance in general are. 
Consider the case of an archer who shoots at the target. He may miss it because he 
misperceived its location, or because he wrongly assessed the strength of the wind. 
Failures like these are due to the agent’s reliance on wrong judgments. Another set of 
cases includes misses which are due to such events as an unexpected rush of wind. 
Failures which are results of such occasions are not really mistakes at all. Quite often an 
agent cannot be held responsible for such failures since there are accidents which cannot 
be predicted in principle. Others can be prevented by taking reasonable precautions. 
However, it seems to me that there is also a third class of failures. There are failures 
which result from a poor exercise of skill by the agent whose skills are far from perfect. 
In the case of our archer he might miss just because he is not very skillful, even though 
he assesses the conditions quite correctly and nothing unusual happens at the moment of 
his shot. 
Skill can also be characterized as knowledge how to do something.79 Ryle has 
famously argued that knowledge how to perform various activities is not reducible to 
propositional knowledge. Even though Ryle’s primary argument was recently 
challenged,80
                                                 
79 For the classical discussion of “knowing how” as opposed to “knowing that” see Ryle’s Concept of 
Mind, chapter 2. 
 it still seems evident that skill does not consist merely in the knowledge of 
rules of some activity or in some similar propositional knowledge: it can be gained only 
80 See Setiya 2008, 402-3. 
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by practice. And in any way when we are exercising some skill, especially the one which 
we have mastered to a considerable degree, we do not consider even those propositions, 
the knowledge of which is definitely part of what it means to possess that skill. All this 
suggests that failures which are due to the lack of skill should not be attributed to 
mistakes of judgment in the Anscombe’s sense. Nor are they accidental: on the contrary, 
it is not surprising that unskillful agents make mistakes, and nothing extraordinary or 
even simply unexpected is needed to appeal to for the explanation of such failures. 
It is not as easy to provide particular examples of mistakes of performance proper 
when the agent judges that she is doing something while she actually does not. I suggest 
that there are a few reasons for that. First, we use some of our skills, such as basic skills 
that operate in our everyday bodily or mental actions, at such a level that there are 
virtually no failures due to the exercise of these skills when there are no mistakes of 
judgment. Thus, we do not fail in the exercise of our skill of walking when there are no 
mistakes of judgment (such as failures to perceive an unevenness of the ground). 
Second, when we speak of exercises of more complex skills, we typically do not say of 
our actions that we successfully do them until we actually have finished them. Rather, 
we use the tentative expressions such as “I am trying to do X,” which correspond to such 
tentative expressions as “it seems to me that p” in the case of observational knowledge. 
Third, (and this might be an explanation for the second point), when we master skills, we 
simultaneously acquire the abilities to assess our own performance in accordance with 
the norms which govern exercises of that skill. Still, it is possible to point out to some 
examples of mistaken judgments about one’s own action based on the mistake in 
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performance. These occur when an agent still does not master a skill very well. For 
example, a beginner cook might think that he is currently making some really delicious 
food while in fact he is not (and his failure might be accounted for not by mistakes of 
judgment, such as ignorance of which ingredients should be used and how many of them 
or of the right time for some actions, but by his failure to mix the ingredients in the right 
way or by failure to actually perform all the actions in the right order and at the right 
time). 
With this understanding of the distinct category of failures in performance in 
place we are now in the position to understand non-observational practical knowledge 
better. I suggest that it is related to “knowledge how.” In this my approach is close to 
that of Kieran Setiya, developed in his recent papers (2008) and (2009). However, as I 
will shortly show, I differ from Setiya in one crucial respect. 
Setiya expounds his view is opposition to David Velleman’s account of practical 
knowledge.81
                                                 
81 Velleman 1989. 
 For Velleman, as for Setiya, intentions involve beliefs that one is going to 
do what one intends to do. The formation of these belief-components of intentions is 
justified by the fact that once they are formed we are tend to act so as to realize them. 
More precisely, the belief that one is going to do A, that is involved in intention to do A, 
is justified by the fact that once that belief is formed one becomes aware of her own 
intention to do A (introspectively) and of her general ability to do A. Similarly one can 
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justify her belief that she is currently doing A by reference to the same evidence: that she 
intends to do A, and that she has the general ability to do A.82
Setiya’s main problem with this theory is that it suggests that formation of 
intention involves a “leap of faith,” since beliefs associated with intentions become 
justified only after they are formed, not before that. While Velleman simply accepts this 
consequence, it is not so appealing to many others, including Setiya. Basically, Setiya 
suggests to supplement Velleman’s explanation by reference to the agent’s knowledge 
how. Thus, “[k]nowing how to clench my fist is among the conditions in virtue of which 
I am epistemically justified in forming the belief that figures in my intention.”
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While I agree with Setiya that knowledge how is essential for understanding 
knowledge of our current actions (as well as future actions, but I will not discuss it here), 
I think that his account faces essentially the same problem as neo-expressivism. Since 
both the general ability to do A and knowledge how to do A are dispositions, they are 
insufficient to provide us with knowledge that we are doing A at the particular moment 
of time when we are doing A. Setiya seems to be aware of this problem and appease its 
acuteness in the following way:  
 In 
general, if I understand Setiya’s view correctly, the justification of one’s belief that one 
is going to do A or that one is currently doing A is, on Setiya’s account, that 1) one 
intends to do A, 2) one has the general ability to do A, and 3) one knows how to do A. 
The knowledge how is supposed to solve the problem of a leap of faith. 
                                                 
82 Setiya 2008, 398-400. 
83 Setiya 2009, 135. 
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Part of what is involved in knowing how to ϕ, in the present case, is 
propositional knowledge that I can do it by doing ABC. That I know this 
proposition solves the mystery how I can know that I am doing ϕ if I know 
that I am doing ABC [the basic action via which ϕ is done]. But how do I 
know that I am doing ABC? We can say at least this. If I know how to take 
those basic means, this knowledge consists in the disposition to execute the 
corresponding intentions. Since I have this disposition, it is no accident that, 
when I intend and thus believe that I am doing ABC, I am doing so in fact. 
Exercising basic knowledge how ensures non–accidentally true belief.84
However, while it is correct to say that if I intend to do ABC and have the 
disposition to execute this intention, it is non-accidental that I will do it, it does not 
follow that it is non-accidental that I execute the intention to do ABC at the particular 
moment t, when I have the belief that I am doing ABC. But then Setiya’s conditions do 
not suffice to provide justification for beliefs about our own actions. Thus, Setiya’s 
account appears to be insufficient.
 
85
However, it is not so difficult to make a correction now. What needs to be said is 
simply that it is not just knowledge how (together with other Setiya’s conditions) that 
provides justification to relevant beliefs, but the intentional exercise of this knowledge 
how. Thus, my belief that I am currently doing A is justified by my intentional exercise 
of my knowledge how to do A. The exercise of knowledge how is not a disposition and 
thus can perfectly justify beliefs that one is doing something at a particular moment of 
time. Moreover, once the intentional exercise of knowledge how to do A is in place, it is 
even superfluous to specify the additional condition of being able to do A, since one who 
is already exercising her knowledge to do A evidently has the general ability to do A. 
 
                                                 
84 Setiya 2009, 136. 
85 Velleman’s account suffers from the same problem as well as from the “leap of faith problem,” and thus 
is worse than Setiya’s. 
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Perhaps, it would be helpful to specify in a more detail the concept of 
“intentional exercising of knowledge how.” On my account “intentional exercising of 
knowledge how to do A” is a cognitive aspect of the action A, which arguably is not 
reducible to the knowledge of propositions which express the rules and conditions of 
successfully performing A. However, since it is a cognitive aspect, it can be used to 
justify the belief that I am currently performing A. 
This account seems to apply neatly to intentional bodily actions. Whether it is 
applicable to all mental actions is, as I have indicated at the beginning of this section, 
doubtful. An attempt to apply this account to such actions will run approximately as 
follows: 1) An agent’s belief that she is imagining something is justified by her 
intentional exercise of her knowledge how to imagine that thing. 2) An agent’s belief 
that she is concentrating her attention on something is justified by her intentional 
exercise of her knowledge how to concentrate attention. 
Whether this attempt is defensible is a question for further consideration.
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize: I have argued that the accounts of self-knowledge which are prominent 
in the contemporary literature are inadequate for the explanation of all kinds of self-
knowledge. I further argued that it is more reasonable to distinguish different categories 
of entities with respect to which we have distinctive first-personal privilege, and to 
explain this privilege for each of these categories separately. In this work I have 
suggested one classification of the relevant entities: occurrent passive mental events, 
mental actions and attitudes. Self-knowledge of attitudes is, as I have argued, derivative 
from self-knowledge of the two other kinds. 
In the previous Chapter I have paid special attention to the account of knowledge of 
our own actions. I have argued that the most reasonable explanation of such knowledge 
is that we possess a source of non-observational knowledge of our actions. In principle 
one could have stopped at this point, but since recently some attempts were made to 
relate knowledge of our actions to practical knowledge in the sense of “knowledge 
how,” I have also presented some considerations on this point. It is plausible that 
“knowedge how” is related to self-knowledge of complex actions (both bodily and 
mental), but it is not quite clear whether the same can be said about the most simple 
mental actions, such as changing the focus of one’s attention. 
A few words are in order to say concerning the relation between self-knowledge of 
attitudes and self-knowledge of mental actions. In Chapter III I have argued (in 
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agreement with the rational agency approach) that we have first-person privilege with 
respect to our attitudes partly insofar as we form these attitudes via deliberation. Now, 
arguably deliberation that results in the formation of beliefs (and, perhaps, also 
intentions, although this is much more controversial) is not something that is done at 
will, at least in ordinary cases. Even so, deliberation is inextricably connected with 
various mental actions. First, deliberation presupposes sustaining the subject’s attention 
at its topic, which is a mental action. Second, even though judgments are arguably not 
actions as far as our assent or rejection of their content is concerned, the utterances of 
judgments (whether overt or covert) are actions. Arguably, these utterances are what 
bring the content of judgments into consciousness. Thus, mental actions make the 
content of our deliberations conscious, providing self-knowledge of our thoughts and 
reasoning, as well as, derivatively, of self-knowledge of our attitudes. 
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